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Environmental Policy and Audit Pricing 
 
 






This paper examines the effect of environmental policy stringency on audit pricing. Exploiting the 
exogenous variation in environmental policies across 26 countries, we find that firms in countries 
with more stringent environmental policies incur lower audit fees. The inverse association is more 
pronounced in common law countries, in countries with a higher level of public enforcement of 
regulations, and in countries with more protection of investors. The lower audit fees are also more 
prominent for firms followed by more analysts and firms with larger institutional ownership. 
Furthermore, we find that firms in countries with strong regulations are better and more innovative 
at managing environmental risk, which implies that better environmental performance of the firms 
following stronger regulations could lower the business risks and thus, decrease audit fees. Overall, 
our findings suggest that compliant firms benefit from environmental policy stringency. 
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The concern about environmental protection and safety is now on the center stage of debate of 
economic policy for sustainable development. On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) was enacted in the United States to promote the enhancement of the 
environment safety. Moreover, since the United Nations published the Brundtland Report in 1987 
(Brundtland, 1987), which was followed by the adoption of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and Paris agreement in 2015, the question of 
how and why corporations should consider environmental challenges in their strategies has drawn 
considerable attention around the world.1 In addition, repeated occurrences of corporate 
environmental disasters and scandals in the recent decades around the world, such as the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, Volkswagen emission scandal in 2015, etc., have made the 
concern of environmental safety a top priority in regulating the corporations.2 In doing so 
effectively, countries are increasingly opting in for the adoption of a more stringent environmental 
policy.  
While, in general, a strong legal system proves its efficacy in ensuring the rights of both 
shareholder and non-shareholder stakeholders (e.g., Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1998; Nenova, 2003), how environmental regulations might affect the firms is an inconclusive 
issue. For example, strict environmental regulations create incentives for the firms to avoid myopic 
behaviors that hurt the firms in the long terms (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010), and to invest in 
greener and newer technologies (e.g., Ambec and Lanoie, 2008), which make firms more 
 
1 The recent UN report, published just ahead of the Climate Action Summit 2019 in New York, puts emphasis on the 
immediate requirement of “unprecedented” actions by both government and business to fight the environmental crisis 
(NDC Global Outlook Report, 2019). 
2 Some other notable environmental disasters and scandals are: Bhopal disaster in 1984, Great Barrier Reef oil spill in 
2010, and Duke Energy coal ash spill in 2014. Due to its long lasting and widespread effects on the environment and 
people, each environmental misconduct usually induces several negative reactions from both financial and non-
financial stakeholders and results in significant financial penalties. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542562
3 
 
competitive and efficient in the use of resources (e.g., Simpson and Bradford, 1996; Greaker, 2003; 
Clemens and Douglas, 2006). On the other hand, the evidence against strict environmental policy 
suggests that tougher environmental regulations rather make the firms less competitive (e.g., 
Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017) and encourage the firms to relocate to less regulated regions (e.g., 
Levinson and Taylor, 2008).  
Even though existing literature does not provide any conclusive evidence on how 
environmental regulations create net benefits for firms, there is no doubt appreciating the fact that 
the environmental policy of a country can profoundly change the operational procedures and risk 
structures of the businesses. Given the material impacts that regulations can exert on the 
businesses, surprisingly, there is scarce evidence on how auditors, who are responsible for 
assessing any material risks associated with clients’ compliance with environmental regulations 
(International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240, ISA 250), respond to the changes in the 
environmental policy of a country. Therefore, to fill in the gap in the literature, in this paper, we 
examine the relationship between the stringency of environmental regulations and pricing of the 
audit services of the affected clients.  
We argue that clients in countries with stricter environmental regulations would 
experience, on average, lower audit fees than clients in countries with relatively lax environmental 
regulations. This is due to several strong positive factors associated with a stringent environmental 
policy that should considerably reduce both business risks of the clients and audit risk. First and 
foremost, strict regulations create incentives for firms to perform better in environmental risk 
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management.3 Empirical evidence of prior literature suggests that better environmental 
management significantly help reduce the business risks of the firms. For example, better 
environmental risk management could lower stock price crash risk (Kim, Li, and Li, 2014), 
idiosyncratic risk (Lee and Faff, 2009), and total risk (Jo and Na, 2012), which helps decrease the 
cost of capital (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Chava, 2014; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kim, and Park, 
2018). Such risk mitigating effects of strong environmental management are mainly driven by its 
positive impact on the efficiency in the use of resources (e.g., Hart, 1997), the profitability (e.g. 
Nehrt, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997), the value of intangible assets (Konar and Cohen, 2001), and 
both accounting and market performance (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2011; Guenster, 
Bauer, Derwell, and Koedijk, 2011). In addition, better environmental risk management could also 
reduce the existing risks from the known hazards and potential risks from the currently unknown 
hazards, both of which affect a firm’s business risk exposure.4 
Further, importantly, prior studies that examined environmental factors as one of the 
dimensions of CSR, find that socially responsible firms are less likely to be involved in earnings 
management (Kim, Park, and Bension, 2012), more likely to produce better quality financial 
reports reporting (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 
2012), which lead to a reduction in audit fees and a lower likelihood of modified audit opinion 
(Du, Jian, Zeng, and Chang, 2018).   
 
3 The Volkswagen is one the many cases of corporate environmental disasters that show how damaging could be the 
consequence of the absence of strict regulations.  European nations adopted a less stringent policy on NOx (Nitrogen 
Oxide) emissions than the U.S., which was perceived to create competitive advantages for the European automakers 
(Miravete et al., 2018). Such lax regulations in the home country was one of the key reasons that motivate Volkswagen 
to cheat on more restrictive U.S. emission policy, violating the U.S. clean air act. Such once profitable strategy resulted 
in dire consequences, with a hefty payment of $33 billion for product fixes and other fines and legal costs (Wilmot, 
2019). 
4 Moreover, as a firm makes strategic investments to reduce emissions and pollution, it mitigates the litigation risk 
either from governmental regulators or from nongovernmental stakeholders (e.g., King and Shaver, 2001). 
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Second, since managers usually lack enough motivation to channeling resources towards 
environmental policies, government regulations work as an effective mechanism in creating 
incentives for allocating resources to better environmental management. A key reason corporate 
investment in environmental concerns face managerial inertia is that such investment, which serves 
both shareholder and non-shareholder stakeholders, often does not fit with the managerial 
objective of shareholder value maximization. Additionally, it creates a concern of potential loss of 
competitive advantages if peer firms do not adopt such a policy. Moreover, implementing a 
successful green policy in a firm involves rigorous process of redesigning and reorganizing 
production process (e.g., Klassen and Whybark, 1999; King and Lenox, 2002; Marcus and 
Fremeth, 2009), which is also largely subjective and unverifiable (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
2009), and thus, results in a managerial effort that remains unfairly compensated. Therefore, a 
strong regulation imposed by government could effectively incentivize the firms to be better at 
environmental risk management (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006), and 
remove the concern of loss of competitive advantages since it usually applies to all firms in the 
similar businesses within an economy. 
Thus, we hypothesize that auditors, being concerned about the clients’ profitability and 
survivability to minimize their engagement risk (e.g., DeFond, Lim, and Zhang, 2016), would 
charge lower fees for the audit services provided to the clients operating in the countries with strict 
environmental regulations. Essentially, we predict a negative relationship between the stringency 
of environmental regulations of a country and the audit pricing of the firms in that country. 
Using firm- and country-level data from 26 countries over the period 2000-2012, we 
exploit inter-temporal changes in environmental regulations at the country-level to investigate the 
impact of environmental policy stringency on audit pricing. The environmental policy stringency 
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index from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is based on 
both market and non-market based policies adopted by countries in each year. The index varies 
across countries and years and is exogenous to the corporate decision making process. 
More specifically, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method to investigate 
whether the stringency of environmental policies affects audit pricing. The DID method effectively 
controls for covariates and allows us to compare audit pricing between treatment and control 
groups after a change in a country’s stringency of environmental regulation: firms from countries 
that experience a change in environmental regulation (treatment group) versus firms from 
countries that do not experience a change in environmental regulation (control group).  The key 
assumption of DID is that, conditional on controls, treated and control firms are only randomly 
different. Our empirical specification controls for relevant firm and country characteristics as in 
prior studies. To mitigate the omitted-variable problem, we also control for firm fixed effects to 
account for the time-invariant firm characteristics and for industry-year fixed effects to absorb the 
time-varying shocks in specific industries that may affect audit pricing at the industry level. In our 
baseline results, we find that the stringency of environmental regulations is negatively related to 
audit fees. We also employ a dynamic analysis as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) to address 
the potential concern of reverse causality and find that the current year’s audit fees do not have 
any significant relationship with future change in policy stringency.  
In further analyses, we examine potential public and private channels through which the 
firms could be incentivized to follow stringent environmental regulations, thereby, strongly 
influence the negative impact of environmental policy stringency on the audit fees. Prior research 
documents a significant impact of legal systems of the countries on audit risks (e.g., Choi, Kim, 
Liu, and Simunic, 2008, 2009; Francis and Wang, 2008; Hope and Langli, 2010). While the 
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presence of strong legal environment might increase audit risk through increasing the risk of 
litigation, it also can lower the audit risk through creating right incentives for the firms to protect 
the interests of the stakeholders. We find that the negative relationship between the stringency of 
environmental policy and audit fees are more prominent for the firms in countries with better legal 
environment, public enforcement of laws, and/or investor protections. It implies that a strong legal 
environment is conducive for achieving the positive impact of environmental policy on various 
corporate outcomes.  
Additionally, we investigate how certain firm characteristics could play role in influencing 
the negative impact of policy stringency on audit fees. More specifically, we focus on the presence 
of outside monitors, such as analysts and institutional investors, who can closely monitor and 
analyze the financial statements and day-to-day activities of the firms. For example, prior research 
identifies the analysts as the effective monitors of the firms (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Knyazeva, 2007; Yu, 2008; Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 2010). Also, institutional investors can 
have a very strong incentive in monitoring the firms and even to intervene and participate in the 
corporate decision-making process (e.g., Shleifer and Vishney, 1997; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 
1988; Jensen, 1993). In our empirical tests, we find that firms with higher analyst coverage and 
firms with larger institutional ownership tend to experience a stronger negative impact of policy 
stringency on audit fees.  
Since the purpose of a strong environmental regulation is to create incentives for the firms 
to invest in environment-friendly projects (e.g., Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Bénabou and Tirole, 
2010), the benefits of a regulation largely depend on how the firms comply with it. In other words, 
how actively and innovatively the firms respond to environmental policies could be the key direct 
channel through which better environmental risk management and lower business risk and audit 
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fees could be realized. Using the environmental pillar score form Thomson Reuters ASSET4 that 
captures three areas of environmental performances of the firms: emission reduction, resource 
efficiency, and product innovation, we find that following the passage of stringent environmental 
policies, firms tend to significantly improve their environmental performance. Our further 
evidence also shows that the strict regulations in environment create incentives for the firms to be 
more productive in green innovation. These findings suggest a potential channel through which 
firms can reduce their environment-related business risks and thereby lower the audit fees. 
 Our study contributes to the existing literature in multiple ways. First, we show that 
environmental regulations do matter in the pricing of audit services. Prior evidence shows that a 
country’s legal regime could influence audit pricing (e.g., Choi, Ki, Liu, and Simunic, 2008). To 
the best of our knowledge to date, our paper is, however, the first to show how the stringency of 
environmental policy could affect audit prices at the international level. We provide evidence that 
increased environmental protection in the form of more stringent environmental policies is 
associated with an improvement in firms’ environmental pillar scores and green innovation, 
implying firms’ positive responses to the policies, thereby decreasing auditors’ expected liability 
and audit effort, and thus are associated with lower audit fees.5 
Second, our paper contributes the literature on how changes in environmental policy affect 
the perception of risks. There is a long list of papers that show the far-reaching effects of 
environmental regulations on the operational decisions and risk structures of the businesses (e.g., 
Simpson and Bradford, 1996; Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017). Our 
 
5Our paper is different from a related paper, Li, Simunic, and Ye (2014). They examine how the exposure to 
environmental risk, captured by toxics releases, affects the audit pricing for U.S. public companies, whereas the focus 
of our paper is on how a macro-basis change of environmental policy affects a firm’s audit pricing in an international 
setting.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542562
9 
 
evidence shows that environmental regulation influences the auditors’ assessment of their audit 
risk as well as their clients’ business risk, as revealed in the change of audit fees. 
Third, the results of our paper contribute to the understanding of the public policy issue: 
how environmental regulation might create net benefits for the businesses.6 While there are 
viewpoints both for and against environmental regulations (e.g., McGuire, 1982; Greaker, 2003; 
Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017), our finding of the negative association between stringent 
environmental policy and audit fees provides additional evidence favoring the policy viewpoint 
that strong environmental regulations can create certain benefits for the corporations. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses 
development. Section 3 describes our study sample and methodology. Section 4 reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 discusses the results from channel tests. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1. Environment policy stringency and business risk  
According to Simunic’s (1980) classic framework of audit fee determination, audit service 
is an economic good that derives its value from providing assurance to financial information 
disclosed by the client firms. In providing the audit service, the key objective of the auditors is to 
minimize the engagement risk, which is exposure to “loss or injury from litigation, adverse 
publicity, or other events arising in connection with the audited financial statements” (SAS 106). 
Three sources of engagement risk are: (1) business risk of the client - the risk arising from the 
client’s ability of surviving and generating profits; (2) audit risk – the risk of failing to detect 
 
6A good example of how strong regulation can create net benefit for a society is a congressionally mandated report 
published by the Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 on cost-benefit analysis of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990 (USEPA Office of Air and Radiation, 2011). The report shows that the economic costs of the act were valued 
at $53 billion, whereas the benefits attained $1.3 trillion. Further, the report argues that regulations can have other 
economic benefits that cannot be directly measured, such as betterment of the health of workers and children, which 
can improve productivity of the workers as well as lower the health care cost. 
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material misstatements; and (3) business risk of the auditor – the risk of incurring litigation costs 
and losing reputation due to alleged failure of audit (DeFond, Lim, and Zhang, 2016).  
 Theoretically, both the magnitude and likelihood of expected future losses from engaging 
with a client firm affects audit fees (Simunic, 1980). In other words, auditors mitigate their 
engagement risk by putting efforts, as reflected in audit fees, in correctly and timely identifying 
the business risks of the clients. This relationship between the clients’ business risks and audit fees 
is well established in the literature (e.g., O’ Keefe, Simunic, and Stein, 1994; Pratt and Stice, 1994; 
Bell, Landsman, and Shackleford, 2001; Lyon and Maher, 2005). In the context of our analysis, 
how environmental policy stringency could affect the clients’ business risks should be the main 
concern of the auditors.  
 On the negative side, the absence of proper management of environmental risk due to 
negligence and the concern of cost reduction might lead to long lasting and financially draining 
disasters. Matsumara, Prakash, and Vera-Muñoz (2014) find that on average, a firm experiences a 
loss of $212,000 of its value for every additional thousand metric tons of carbon emissions. On the 
other hand, better environmental performance helps the firm to have better control over energy 
consumption, input costs, and efficient use and reuse of the resources (Taylor, 1992; Hart, 1997; 
Bansal and Roth, 2000; Buysse and Verbeke, 2003). Moreover, evidence suggests that firms 
performing better in the different areas of stakeholder management, including environment, have 
lower stock price crash risk (Kim, Li, and Li, 2014), idiosyncratic risk (Lee and Faff, 2009), and 
total risk (Jo and Na, 2012). Eventually, these firms tend to incur a low cost of capital (Sharfman 
and Fernando, 2008; Chava, 2014).7  
 
7 In a recent study within an international setting, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kim, and Park (2018) investigate 
manufacturing firms in 30 countries for the period of 2002-2011 and find that the firms with better practices of 
environmental risk management tend to have a lower cost of equity. The evidence suggests that the investors perceive 
the environment-friendly firms as less risky and thus, require less risk premium. 
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 Further, prior studies of CSR, where environmental performance is examined as one of the 
dimensions, find that socially responsible firms, compared to the firms that are less socially 
responsible, are associated with lower involvement in earnings manipulation (Kim, Park, and 
Bension, 2012), more transparent practices of financial reporting (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 
2011; Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012), and lower audit fees and lower likelihood 
of modified audit opinion (Du, Jian, Zeng, and Chang, 2018).  
 Overall, findings of prior studies unequivocally confirm that better environmental 
management is associated with a significant reduction in systematic risk and improvement in 
reporting quality, which should profoundly influence the auditors’ assessment of the business risk 
of the clients.8 Next, we move to discuss and hypothesize how stringent environmental regulation 
is supposed to influence the client firms’ practices of environmental practices and thereby, 
influence the audit fees.  
2.2. Potential impact of stringent environment policy on audit fees 
Even though better environmental risk management lowers the systematic risk of the firms, 
managers are often reluctant to allocate resources in green policies for several reasons. First, 
investment in environmental policies does rarely align with the objective of shareholder profit 
maximization. Thus, managers tend to overlook such costly investment strategies at the expense 
of the welfare loss of non-shareholder stakeholders and loss of long-term benefits of the 
companies. Second, implementing a successful green policy inside a company is very costly but 
 
8 Other positive effects of better environmental performance that might not directly reduce the business risks but could 
indirectly affect the volatility of firm performances are: increase in the profitability of the firms (Hart and Ahuja, 
1996; Nehrt, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997), decrease in cost and increase income (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008), increase 
in the value of a firm’s intangible assets (Konar and Cohen, 2001), increase in market value (Klassen and McLaughlin, 
1996), and improvement in financial performance (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2011). Similarly, Dowell, 
Hart, and Yueng (2000) find that U.S. multinational firms that adopt a stringent global environment standard (rather 
than countries’ local less stringent standards) have higher market values. In a comprehensive study, Guenster, Bauer, 
Derwell, and Koedijk (2011) find that better environmental performance tends to improve a firm’s both accounting 
and market based measures of performance.   
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non-remunerative. It requires rigorous managerial efforts of redesigning and reorganizing the 
operations procedures, which are operationally complicated and challenging (e.g., Klassen and 
Whybark, 1999; King and Lenox, 2002; Marcus and Fremeth, 2009). Moreover, since such efforts 
are subjective and unverifiable (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009), managers run a high risk of not 
being fairly compensated. Third, another managerial concern of channeling resources towards 
environmental strategy is the potential loss of competitive advantage, since peer firms that invest 
capital in more immediate profit-oriented strategies could acquire a better market position.    
We argue that stringent environmental regulations effectively address managerial concerns 
raised from the adoption of green policies. There are at least three benefits of government 
intervention in CSR practices (Williams and Aguilera, 2008): first and foremost, at the very top, it 
sets the social expectations about corporate responsibilities for the society, which applies to firms 
across all industries. Second, at a more granular level, it generates institutional actions taken by 
groups of stakeholders more closely related to the firms, such as local communities, institutional 
investors, which strongly incentivize the firms to comply with the regulations. Third, overall, 
government interventions in CSR policies sets the tone of national importance of socially 
responsible activities, which gets echoed and bolstered through initiatives undertaken by 
institutions from different spheres of a country. 
Therefore, creating strong incentives for green policies through regulatory platforms, firms 
in countries with a stringent environmental policy are more likely to be better at environmental 
risk management. In addition to this, the managerial concern of potential loss of competitive 
advantages in an economy becomes invalid in the presence of regulations imposed by 
governments, since such rules are enforced by regulatory agencies that apply to all firms in similar 
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businesses within an economy and thereby, firms undertake green policies in a fair play 
environment.  
Therefore, our hypothesis is – 
H1: There would be a negative relationship between the stringency in environmental regulation 
and audit fees 
However, strong regulations do not necessarily lead to the presupposed positive outcomes 
unless the rules are effectively practiced by the companies. Companies are highly likely to comply 
with regulations if there are both effective legal enforcement and public and private monitoring. 
We identify two channels, the legal regime as the public channel, and effective external monitoring 
as the private channel, which can make the firms highly incentivized to follow the government 
regulations. From the context of the legal regime, we can argue for a legal environment in which 
the non-shareholder stakeholders can exercise their rights would be more effective in 
implementing environmental regulations. Therefore, since common law is more oriented towards 
protecting the rights of a private citizen (La Porta et al., 1998), we further hypothesize that – 
H1.1A. The negative relationship between the stringency of environment regulations and audit 
fees would be predominantly high in countries with common law tradition 
H1.1B. The negative relationship between the stringency of environment regulations and audit fees 
would be predominantly high in countries with strong public enforcement agencies 
H1.1C. The negative relationship between the stringency of environment regulations and audit fees 
would be predominantly high in countries with strong shareholder protection 
Next, besides the effectiveness of legal regimes and public monitoring agencies, we argue 
that external monitoring of private institutions can also play as an effective mechanism in strongly 
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incentivizing the companies to comply with regulations. From this context, first, we recognize the 
role played by analysts following a company and hypothesize that – 
H1.2A. Companies extensively followed by analysts would show a stronger negative relationship 
between stringent environmental regulations and audit fees 
Another important group of external monitors we consider is the institutional shareholders, 
who have the incentive to scrutinize the activities of the firms (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980), 
and exert considerable influence on the decision making process of the firms in ensuring good 
governance (e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Jensen, 1993). So, our next hypothesis is – 
H1.2B. Companies with high institutional ownership would show a stronger negative relationship 
between stringent environmental regulations and audit fees 
Finally, we examine the direct channel through which stringent regulations are supposed 
to reduce systematic risk, which is better environmental risk management and green innovation. 
Thus, we hypothesize that – 
H1.3. Companies with better environmental risk management and more green innovation would 
show a stronger negative relationship between stringent environmental regulations and audit fees 
Note that our hypotheses are exposed to the alternative plausible view that strict 
environmental standards would rather create more potential liabilities both for the clients and the 
auditors. Usually the implementation of an environmental regulation comes with the plausible 
threat of financial penalties, liabilities, and legal actions against the violators (Stewart, 1993). Prior 
evidence suggests that environmental regulations are likely to reduce productivity through 
committing the firms to allocate resources for non-productive uses such as waste management, 
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environmental inspection and auditing, and litigation expenses and liabilities (Haveman and 
Christiansen, 1981; Gray and Shadbegian, 1995; Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic, 2008).9  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our final sample is derived from the intersection of several databases. We obtain 
environmental policy stringency index from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) database and draw firms’ accounting data and audit fees information from 
the Worldscope database. We obtain analyst coverage information from the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, institutional ownership information from Factset, and 
environmental scores from Thomson Reuters ASSET4. Country-specific characteristics are from 
La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) and the World Bank. Our final sample includes 123,322 firm-year 
observations from 26 countries over the period 2000-2012.  
3.2. Measure of environmental policy stringency 
The measure of environmental policy stringency index published by the OECD provides 
information on policy strength of each OECD country. Essentially, it uses aggregate information 
of environmental policies and comes up with a composite indicator that can capture relative 
stringency over time and across economies. More specifically, the database employs 15 different 
instruments of environmental policy, which are broadly categorized as Market Based (MB) and 
Non-Market Based (NMB), as can be observed in the figure of Appendix A. MB policies include 
 
9 Specific to environmental regulation, auditors are responsible for identifying risks associated with significant accrual 
of environmental remediation liabilities (ISA 240). In addition to that, auditors hold the responsibilities of ensuring 
the clients’ compliance with environmental factors that could be fundamental to survival, to an operating procedure, 
and to the avoidance of incurring material liabilities due to a violation (ISA 250). Nonetheless, complexities associated 
with the tasks of ensuring that the client firms comply with the environmental regulation could require nontrivial 
amount of auditing effort. 
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taxes (CO2, SOx, NOx and Diesel), feed in tariffs (solar and wind), certificates (CO2, renewables 
energy, energy efficiency), and the application of deposit and refund scheme. NMB policies 
include government expenditure on R&D related to renewable energy and government restrictions 
on pollutants (NOx, SOx, particular matters and Sulphur content of diesel). In aggregates, the 
instruments capture both “Stick” type policies that make the pollution activities more costly, and 
“Carrot” type policies that incentivize the companies to be more environmentally friendly. 
 The final EPS score is the equally weighted average of MB and NMB policy instruments.10 
On a 0 to 6 scale, 6 indicates the highest level of stringency. Since the scoring process of EPS is 
based on sample distribution of each policy instruments across countries and over time, the final 
standardized score does not only show the policy strength of a country, it also captures a country’s 
level stringency at a specific time related to other economies and other periods. In other words, the 
construction of EPS facilitates the comparison of the strength of country’s policy both to its 
previous historical record and to the positions of other countries. Nonetheless, EPS is solely based 
on actual policies which makes it an appropriate measure in examining the impact of 
environmental policy.  
 For our empirical analysis, we construct two variables capturing the magnitude of 
environmental policy stringency utilizing the OECD-provided EPS score. First, we use the variable 
Envdex_raw, which represents the raw EPS score for each country-year observation. Second, we 
use Envdex as an alternative measure of EPS, which captures the long-run trends of policy 
stringency. Following Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015), this alternative measure is calculated 
using a recursive method. Essentially, starting from 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗,2000 = 0, the EPS score for a country 
j in period t is:  
 
10 For a detail discussion on the methodology, please see Botta and Koźluk (2014). 
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                                            𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝑡                                                  (1) 
where 𝑅𝑗,𝑡=+1 if EPS increases in country j in year t, 𝑅𝑗,𝑡=-1 if EPS decreases in country j in year 
t, and 𝑅𝑗,𝑡=0 for no change. The objective of this alternative measure is to capture long run effects 
of policy stringency. 
3.3. Control variables  
To test our hypothesis, we consider Ln(AuditFee), the natural logarithm of the  value of audit fees, 
as the dependent variable. Following the extant audit literature, we consider a series of client firm, 
auditor, and country characteristics that are known to affect audit fees. We use the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets in US dollars (Lnat) to control for firm size; larger firms 
tend to be charged with higher audit fees (e.g., Simunic, 1980). As proxies for audit risk, we use 
the return on assets (ROA); the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets (Invrec) 
and the market-to-book ratio (MB), which are also proxies for audit complexity; Loss, an indicator 
that equals 1 if the firm reports a net loss, and 0 otherwise; Leverage, the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets; quick ratio (Quick), the ratio of current assets less inventories to current liabilities; 
current assets (Current), the ratio of current assets to total assets; and Qualified, an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm receives qualified audit opinions, and 0 otherwise. Higher audit 
risk and higher audit complexity are associated with higher audit fees (e.g., Simunic, 1980; 
Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, 2002; Gosh and Pawlewicz, 2009; Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012; Lyon 
and Maher, 2015). We also use the percentage of total assets in foreign countries (Foreign) to 
quantify audit complexity (e.g., Simunic, 1980). We include the annual market share of the auditor 
(Auditor_ms) in an industry in the firm’s home country. As a proxy for disclosure quality, we use 
Analysts, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm.  
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Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) show that the adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) impacts audit fees; we use an indicator variable (IFRS) that equals 1 for IFRS 
adopters, and 0 otherwise. We include an indicator variable (Cross) that equals to 1 if the firm is 
cross-listed in a foreign country, and 0 otherwise (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, 2002; Choi, Kim, 
Liu, and Simunic, 2009; Kim, Liu, Zheng, 2012). We consider the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) within each two-digit standard industry classification (SIC) code to control for 
concentration in the audit industry (Gosh and Pawlewicz, 2009). Following Choi et al. (2008, 
2009), we use the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita in thousands of U.S. 
dollars (GDP) to control for standards of living across countries and for compensation differences 
that could impact audit fees. The definitions and data sources of all the variables are provided in 
Appendix B. 
3.4. Research design 
We exploit the passage of environment policy, captured by relative stringency index of EPS that 
varies across countries and over time, as a source of exogenous variation in the mechanism of 
environmental policy through which we can identify the causal effect of government policy on 
audit fees. Our baseline DID regression model is as follows: 
               𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = µ𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑∗𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡             (2)  
where i indexes firms, j indexes country where the firm i is headquartered, ind indexes industry, t 
indexes year, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the audit fees, µ𝑖 is firm fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑∗𝑡 is industry-year fixed effects, 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗𝑡 is the index of environmental policy stringency for country j in time t, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 are control 
variables and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
An ideal way to examine the differential impact of policy changes on audit fees for firms 
in a country, such as Australia, is to compare the audit fees before and after policy changes. But 
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the problem with this approach is that other factors, such as a change in global trade environment, 
might drive the government incentive to changing policy. To remove the concern of confounding 
outcome created from the change in macro-environment, we select a country that did not 
experience any change in environmental policy stringency but absorbed the impact of change in 
trade factors, such as USA. For the firms in the USA, the audit fees differences before and after 
2005 should capture the recessionary impacts on audit fees. Therefore, the difference in differential 
audit fees of firms in Australia before and after 2005 and differential audit fess of firms in USA 
should remove the common impact of recession and only capture the impact of changes in 
environmental policy.    
Our treatment sample consists of firms in countries that experience a change in their 
environmental policy compared to the previous period, as revealed by the index of policy 
stringency. On the other hand, countries that do not go through any change in environmental policy 
from the previous period to current period would constitute the sample of control firms. To check 
the differential outcome in audit fees before and after one unit increase in environmental stringency 
in a treatment country, such as Australia - 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡|𝑗 = 𝐴𝑈, 𝑡 = 2005] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1|𝑗 = 𝐴𝑈, 𝑡 − 1 = 2004] = 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑∗𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑∗𝑡−1 + 𝛽    (3) 
Next, for the same time-window, the following equation shows differential outcomes of 
dependent variable for firms in a country, such as US, which did not change its environmental 
policy from the previous period to current period – 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡|𝑗 = 𝑈𝑆, 𝑡 = 2005] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1|𝑗 = 𝑈𝑆, 𝑡 − 1 = 2004] = 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑∗𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑∗𝑡−1     (4) 
Now, after taking the difference of above two equations  
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{𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡|𝑗 = 𝐴𝑈, 𝑡 = 2005] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1|𝑗 = 𝐴𝑈, 𝑡 − 1 = 2004]} − {𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡|𝑗 = 𝑈𝑆, 𝑡 =
2005] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1|𝑗 = 𝑈𝑆, 𝑡 − 1 = 2004]} =  𝛽                                                                    (5) 
In Equation (5), the first difference shows differential audit fees after one unit increase of 
environmental policy stringency, and the second equation shows the change in audit fees following 
no change in environmental policy. Therefore, the coefficient, 𝛽, captures the effect of policy 
changes on audit fees for the firms in countries that implement more stringent policy compared to 
the firms in countries that did not change in the level of policy stringency from year t-1 to t.11    
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our study. Throughout our 
analyses, all values are converted into the U.S. currency. On average, a typical firm is charged 
about U.S. $1.67 million for audit services. A typical firm has an average of about U.S. $2, 367 
million in total assets.  Foreign assets represent about 14% of total assets on average. An auditor’s 
market share in a given country for a given year is on average more than 21%, illustrating that 
international audit markets are more diversified, unlike the U.S. audit market. On average, 19.5% 
of the sample firms adopted the IFRS accounting standards and 6.8% of them are cross-listed in a 
foreign country. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample firms across countries. Among the 26 
countries in this study, Australia, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
 
11 Note that an important identifying assumption in this empirical approach is that the trends of audits fees of firms in 
countries with changing environmental policy stringency should be similar to firms in countries without any change 
of policy stringency. Given this assumption, we can use the trend of outcome of interest in the no-change-of-policy 
countries as the counterfactual outcome in examining the causal effect of policy changes.  
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dominate the sample since each of these countries has more than 1,000 firms and more than 5,000 
observations in the sample. According to the raw (modified) environmental policy stringency 
index, Brazil (Australia) has the least and South Korea (Ireland) has the most stringent 
environmental policy. Firms in Poland pay the lowest audit fees (U.S. $21,000 on average) and 
those in Sweden pay the highest audit fees (more than U.S. $23.5 million on average). 
[Table 2 About Here] 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations between the variables considered in this study. We 
present in bold the correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.  
The indicators of environmental policy stringency (Envdex_raw and Envdex) and the key control 
variables are measured in the year prior observing the audit fees. Both Envdex_raw and Envdex 
are positively correlated with Ln(AuditFee), but the correlations are economically weak at 0.278 
and 0.263, respectively. The positive correlation of 0.751 between Ln(AuditFee) and Lnat concurs 
with the finding in Simunic (1980) that auditors charge higher fees to larger firms. Audit fees are 
positively correlated with the number of analysts. Moreover, the positive coefficient of 0.706 
between Lnat and Analysts indicates that larger firms are more likely to be followed by more 
analysts. The correlation coefficients between each of the two indicators of environmental policy 
stringency and the control variables are relatively small, suggesting no concern about 
multicollinearity. 
[Table 3 About Here] 
4.2 Baseline results 
We consider the following baseline model and use OLS regressions to test our hypothesis: 
𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑤(or 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑥)𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛(𝑋) + ∑(𝐹𝐸) + 𝜀      (6) 
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In Equation (6), 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒)𝑡  is the log-transformed value of audit fees in year t. Our main 
explanatory variable is Envdex_rawt-1 or Envdext-1 to quantify the previous year environmental 
policy stringency.  Envdex_raw is the raw environment policy stringency index from the OECD 
database. We closely imitate Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) to construct the modified index, 
Envdex, as described in Section 3. X represents the previous year firm- and country-level controls 
defined in Section 3. (FE) represents firm fixed effects and year-industry fixed effects to absorb 
the effects of unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics and unobservable time and industry 
characteristics, respectively. We cluster the standard errors at country level for all specifications 
since firms’ audit fees might be jointly determined within the firms’ respective countries.   
[Table 4 About Here] 
The DID regression results reported in Table 4 indicate that audit pricing is inversely 
related to environmental policy stringency. In Columns 2 and 4, with the firm- and country-level 
controls, the coefficients on Envdex_raw and Envdex are -0.122 and -0.039, and are statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. That is, one unit increase in the prior year raw 
(modified) environment policy stringency index corresponds to approximately a 12% (3.9%) 
decrease in audit fees on average. These findings imply that firms tend to comply with/ the new 
policies, making the auditors’ expected liability and audit effort lower, and thereby decreasing 
audit fees. 
Turning to characteristics of client firm, auditor firm, and country, most of our findings are 
consistent with those of other audit pricing studies (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Lyon and Maher, 2005; 
Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic, 2009; Li, Simunic, and Ye, 2014). The positive coefficients of lnat 
indicate that larger client firms are charged higher audit fees. Auditors appear to consider firm 
performance and financial risk since they tend to charge lower fees to firms with higher ROA and 
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firms with higher liquidity ratio, and charge higher fees to firms reporting loss. Financial risk and 
the complexity of operations tend to lead to higher audit fees, as confirmed with the positive 
coefficients of Invrec, Leverage, and Forat. Firms followed by more analysts and served by more 
renowned auditors encountered higher audit fees. Firms in countries with higher GDP are charged 
with higher audit fees.  
Further, the results show that the coefficients of IFRS are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with the argument that IFRS as principle-based 
standards could be timelier in projecting economics events into financial statements (e.g., 
Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Alexander and Archer, 2001), provide effective guidelines to 
limit the managerial scope of choosing opportunistic accounting amounts and thus, lower the risk 
of misstatements (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008), and the resulting improvement in financial 
reporting quality decreases audit fees (Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012).     
4.3. Additional endogeneity tests 
As we discussed above, although the staggered adoption of environmental policy 
stringency that takes place across countries at different magnitudes works as an exogenous shock 
to audit pricing, a concern could arise from the plausible relationship between country-level factors 
and the timing and magnitudes of stringent policy. Considering the fact that country characteristics 
could significantly influence audit fees (e.g., Choi et al., 2009; Jaggi and Low, 2009), such 
relationship could raise the issue of reverse causality if differential audit fees across countries 
directly or indirectly trigger the adoption of stringent policies.  
Thus, to address the concern of reverse causality, we investigate the dynamic effects of 
environmental policy stringency on audit fees. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we 
run dynamic regressions by replacing the single variables Envdex_rawt-1 and Envdext-1 in Equation 
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(2) with a series of five variables Envdex_rawt+n and Envdext+n (n = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2), respectively. 
For example, Envdex_rawt+1 represents the level policy stringency one year after the current year, 
whereas Envdex_rawt-2 shows the level policy stringency 2 years before the current year. From the 
context of reverse causality, the coefficients of Envdex_rawt+1 and Envdex_rawt+2 are important 
since they could show whether there is any relationship of audit fees with future changes in 
environmental policy. The results in Column (1) of Table 5 show the coefficients of 
Envdex_rawt+1, and Envdex_rawt+2 are economically small and not statistically significant. In 
contrast, those of Envdex_rawt-2 and Envdex_rawt, are negative and statistically significant, 
though the coefficient of Envdex_rawt-2 is higher in magnitude. We obtain similar results for 
Envdex in Column (2). The results mitigate the concerns of reverse causality. 
[Table 5 About Here] 
5. Channel tests 
5.1. Country legal regimes 
Since auditors minimize legal costs associated with audit failures, we cannot ignore the 
impact of a country’s legal environment on the audit fees. Prior research documents a significant 
variation of legal risks borne by the auditors across the countries with different legal systems (e.g., 
Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic, 2008, 2009; Francis and Wang, 2008; Hope and Langli, 2010; 
Khurana and Raman, 2004; Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, 2002; Wingate, 1997). While we can 
readily appreciate the importance of legal rights in effective enforcement of a new policy, we 
cannot precisely infer the direction of its impact on the relationship between environmental policy 
stringency and audit fees. On the one hand, a strong legal environment should motivate the auditors 
to put more effort in avoiding of incurring higher legal costs and thus, charge higher audit fees. 
On the other hand, a strong legal foundation of a country can create incentive for the firms to 
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protect the interests of the stakeholders and thereby, minimize the auditors’ concern of clients’ 
motivation of not complying with new policy.  
To examine how legal framework of a country could influence the impact of environmental 
policy stringency on audit fees, we include different measures of legal rights in our original 
empirical model and show the results in Table 6. In Columns (1) and (2), following La Porta et al. 
(1998), we include a dummy variable, Law, for the firms in countries with common law legal 
origin. La Porta et al. (2006) argue that the legal tradition of a country sets up the foundation of its 
legal rights and of its process through which the securities and corporates laws would be 
constructed. 
 According to the legal scholars, there are two broad classes of legal traditions, common 
law and civil or code law (David and Brierly, 1985). Prior research argues that compared to civil 
law, common law provides stronger investor protection since it is better at facilitating the private 
contracts and protecting the rights of private property (La Porta et al., 1998). Furthermore, Wingate 
(1997) argues that auditors are more legally exposed to their potential failure of identifying 
misreporting by clients in common law countries than in civil law countries. The results in 
Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient of the interaction terms between environmental 
policy stringency and Law is negative and statistically significant. It recognizes the important role 
a country’s legal framework can play in implementing environmental policy. However, the legal 
tradition as a historical measure might fail to incorporate the recent changes in the legal rights. 
Therefore, we further examine our results using a recent measure introduced by La Porta et al. 
(2006), Enforce, an index which captures the aggregate measure of public enforcement. The results 
in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 imply that strong public enforcement of laws could intensify the 
environmental regulation effects on audit fees.  
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[Table 6 About Here] 
5.2.  External monitors 
While legal institutions could potentially monitor and control excessive risk-taking 
activities of the firms, there are other key outside parties who can closely monitor day-to-day firm 
operations and can effectively curb corporate risky endeavors. Two such parties we think should 
be relevant to this study are the analysts and the institutional investors. Considering the non-trivial 
role the analysts and the institutional investors can play in influencing corporate policies, auditors 
should consider their potential involvement in facilitating the risk reduction activities of the firms 
following the strict environmental policies.   
There is an extensive body of research recognizing the role of analysts as effective monitors 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Schipper, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Knyazeva, 2007; Yu, 
2008; Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 2010).12 Essentially, analysts are  the key players in evaluating 
and disseminating public and private information and any potential threats underlying operational 
activities of the firms, and thereby, enforce managerial discipline on risky activities. Therefore, on 
the context of our analysis, we can predict that firms that are extensively monitored by the analysts 
should be more cautious and diligent in following the regulation imposed by the government, and 
thus, would experience a low pricing of audit. We examine this prediction by incorporating an 
interaction term between the environmental policy stringency and number of analysts following 
variables. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, we interact the analysts following variable with the 
index of environmental policy stringency variable. The results show that the negative relationship 
 
12 As Healy and Palepu (2001) depicts, analysts gather information from both public and private sources, analyze 
financial statements, evaluate current performance, and assess future direction of the companies. Analysts’ activities 
of uncovering and disseminating deep insights from public and private information make them very effective in 
monitoring. To their effectiveness, analysts’ role are the key catalysts in discovering corporate fraudulent activities 
(Dyck et al., 2010).      
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between the strength of environmental regulations and audits fees become more pronounced when 
the firms are followed by a large number of analysts.  
Furthermore, prior research shows that institutional investors have incentives for 
monitoring the governance of the firms since they tend to a have significantly high monitoring 
benefits with having a large ownership position of the firms (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Nonetheless, institutional investors hold the power and mechanisms 
to intervene and participate in the corporate decision-making process in ensuring good governance 
(e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Jensen, 1993). Therefore, we further predict that firms 
under large institutional ownership should have strong incentive to comply with environmental 
policy and thus, would enjoy a low audit fee. The results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 confirm 
that the decrease in audit fees is more pronounced for firms with larger institutional investor 
ownership. 
[Table 7 About Here] 
5.3. Environment-friendly corporate policy 
 We can argue that the environmental policy stringency, because of its anticipated various 
positive impacts on the business practices of the regulated entities, might reduce the auditors’ 
perceived risks in dealing with their client firms. In fact, the purpose of a stringent environmental 
regulation is to incentivize the firms to adopt and invest in environment-friendly corporate policies 
(e.g.,Rosen, 2001; Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). Therefore, how actively 
and innovatively the firms take initiatives in environment-friendly activities following the passage 
of strict environmental regulations could be the potential channel that reduces business risk of the 
client firms.  
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In other words, we can predict that the potential key channel through which environmental 
regulations should reduce the auditors’ perceived risks is how the client-firms implement 
environmental-friendly policies. In the absence of firm-initiatives in response to the strong 
policies, we cannot convincingly argue that our results are driven by risk reduction initiatives by 
the client firms through implementing more eco-friendly solutions that lead to the lower audit fees. 
Therefore, as reported in Table 8, using different measures of econ-friendly initiatives of the firms, 
we examine whether there is any significant impact of environmental policy stringency on firm-
level environmental performance. We posit that firms that comply with environmental standards 
would receive higher environmental pillar scores (Environ_score) and generate more green 
innovations measured with the number of environment-related patents (LnGreenPatent) and the 
number of environment-related citations (LnGreenCitation). 
In Panel A of Table 8, we use environmental pillar scores from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
which capture performances in three eco-friendly initiatives of the firms: emission reduction, 
increase of resource efficiency, and product innovation.13 The positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of Envdex_rawt-1 and Envdext-1 of 0.045 and 0.009, respectively, indicate that more 
stringent policies tend to increase environmental pillar scores. In Panel B of Table 8, the 
coefficients of Envdex_rawt-1 are both positive but not statistically significant in Columns (3) and 
(5). The positive and statistically significant coefficients of Envdext-1, 0.005 and 0.009 in Columns 
(4) and (6) indicate that when firms comply with recent more stringent environmental policies, 
they generate more green patents and more green citations, respectively. 
 
13 More specifically, emission reduction score captures the extent of a firm’s initiatives in decreasing emission in 
production and operational activities, resource efficiency measures a firm’s capacity of reducing the use of resources 
and improving supply chain management through implementing more environment-friendly solutions, and product 
innovation measures how a firm’s ability of creating new environmental technologies and solutions that can help 
customers improve their management of environmental costs and responsibilities.   
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[Table 8 About Here] 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine how stringent environmental policy affects the audit pricing. We 
argue that strong environmental regulations would create incentives for the firms to perform better 
in environmental risk management, and thereby, mitigate the business risks associated with 
environmental performance and influence audit fees. We find a significant negative association 
between a strictness in the environmental policy of a country and audit fees. Such relationship is 
more pronounced in the immediate period following the adoption of the stringent policy. 
Furthermore, the negative association stronger in common law countries, in countries with a higher 
level of public enforcement of regulations, and in countries with more protection of investors. 
Additionally, the audit fees following stringent environmental policy become predominantly lower 
for the firms followed by more analysts and firms with larger institutional ownership.  
The results of our study have important implications for the policy makers. While prior 
evidence suggests that there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with the adoption 
of strong environmental regulations, our findings provide support for the argument that regulations 
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Appendix B Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Ln(AuditFee) Natural log of audit fees in U.S. dollars; Worldscope 
Envdex_raw Environmental policy stringency index. Environmental policy 
stringency is defined as policy-induced cost of polluting by firms across 
different sectors and policy instruments. A higher values represents a 
more stringent policy; 
OECD 
Envdex Environmental policy stringency indicator computed following 
Simintzi, Vig and Volpin’s (2015) construction of their Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator. 
OECD 
Lnat Natural log of year-end total assets in U.S. dollars; Worldscope 
ROA Ratio of net income to total assets; Worldscope 
Invrec Sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets; Worldscope 
MB Year-end market-to-book ratio, defined as firm market value 
divided by the common shareholder equity; 
Worldscope 
Loss An indicator that equals 1 when a firm reports a net loss, and 0 
otherwise; 
Worldscope 
Leverage Ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets; Worldscope 




Current Current ratio, defined as the ratio of current assets to total assets; Worldscope 
Qualified An indicator that equals 1 if the firm receives qualified opinions, and 0 
otherwise; 
Worldscope 
Forat The percentage of total assets in foreign countries; Worldscope 
Auditor_ms Annual market share of an auditor in an industry in the home country; Worldscope 
Analyst Natural log of (1+number of analyst following in a year); I/B/E/S 
IFRS An indicator that equals 1 for IFRS adopters and 0 otherwise; Worldscope 
Cross An indicator that equals 1 when a firm is cross-listed in a foreign 
country, and 0 otherwise; 
Worldscope 
HHI Herfindahl Index within each two-digit standard industry classification 
(SIC) code; 
Worldscope 
GDP Natural log of gross domestic product per capita in thousands of U.S. 
dollars; 
The World Bank 
Law An indicator that equals 1 for countries with a common law legal 
tradition and 0 for 
countries with a civil law tradition; 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Enforce Aggregate measure of public enforcement, equal to the arithmetic mean 
of (1) the supervisor characteristics index, (2) the rule-making power 
index, (3) the investigative powers index, (4) the orders index, and (5) 
the criminal index; 
La Porta et al. 
(2006) 
Share_protect Principal component of disclosure, liability standards, and Anti-director 
rights;   
La Porta et al. 
(2006) 
IO Annual ownership by institutional investors; Factset 
Environment 
Score 













Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542562
39 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample of 123,322 firm-year observations for 13 years (2000 to 2012) 
across the 26 countries listed in Table 2. Detailed definitions of the variables are in Appendix A. 
Variables Mean  Median  Std.  p25  P75 Min. Max. 
AuditFee (Million US $) 1.661 0.343 4.106 0.087 1.219 0.002 29.156 
Envdex_raw 1.661 1.692 0.801 0.963 2.229 0.479 3.650 
Envdex 3.660 4.000 2.548 2.000 6.000 -2.000 11.000 
Assets (Million US $) 2366.750 193.227 7311.480 33.694 1040.250 0.116 51763.460 
ROA -0.169 0.060 1.172 -0.026 0.114 -10.510 0.440 
Invrec 0.291 0.269 0.211 0.111 0.434 0.000 0.870 
MB 2.439 1.624 6.047 0.837 3.040 -24.188 36.081 
Loss 0.290 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Leverage 0.293 0.195 0.535 0.036 0.361 0.000 4.735 
Quick 1.998 1.000 3.738 0.621 1.752 0.003 30.663 
Current 2.597 1.545 3.986 1.057 2.508 0.007 32.841 
Qualified 0.082 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Forat 0.136 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.997 
Auditor_ms 0.211 0.100 0.271 0.007 0.304 0.000 1.000 
Analyst 1.806 1.792 1.618 0.000 3.258 0.000 5.595 
IFRS 0.195 0.000 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Cross 0.068 0.000 0.251 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
HHI 0.167 0.085 0.196 0.038 0.217 0.015 1.000 
GDP 8.100 7.908 1.301 7.179 9.415 3.817 13.148 
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Table 2 Sample Distribution by Country 
This table presents the distribution of the sample firms, environmental policy stringency measures, and audit pricing 
in US dollars across 26 countries. For each country, Envdex_raw and Envdex represent the averages of the two 
measures of environmental policy stringency, respectively, and AuditFee is the average audit fees. Detailed definitions 
of the variables are in Appendix A. 
 
Country Name # Obs. # Firms Envdex_raw Envdex 
AuditFee  
(Million US $) 
Australia 6,242 1,223 1.171 -1 4.400 
Austria 110 44 3.329 5 1.761 
Belgium 188 52 2.138 4 3.712 
Brazil 30 16 0.479 0 4.843 
Canada 2,991 847 1.917 1 0.033 
China 2,625 660 0.521 3 9.680 
Denmark 388 76 3.650 5 0.083 
Finland 397 88 3.213 5 3.494 
France 852 275 2.896 9 0.453 
Germany 1,426 360 3.017 3 12.579 
Greece 29 14 2.083 4 1.165 
India 10,157 1,958 0.604 2 0.182 
Ireland 625 103 2.433 11 6.894 
Italy 471 148 2.842 9 8.350 
Japan 5,171 1,337 2.025 7 0.301 
Netherlands 364 103 3.229 2 0.365 
Norway 446 123 1.879 2 6.701 
Poland 138 62 3.375 9 0.021 
Portugal 79 21 2.263 3 3.463 
South Africa 1,126 203 1.817 1 0.759 
South Korea 83 79 3.438 10 0.122 
Spain 439 107 2.963 10 10.636 
Sweden 900 179 3.233 4 23.503 
Switzerland 780 165 2.604 2 2.400 
United Kingdom 12,663 2,171 0.813 0 1.321 
United States 27,613 5,968 2.279 7 2.845 
Total 76,333 16,382  
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Detailed definitions of the variables 
are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1)Ln(AuditFee)t 1.000                                     
(2)Envdex_rawt-1 0.278 1.000 
                 
(3)Envdext-1 0.263 0.619 1.000 
                
(4)Lnat 0.751 0.120 0.112 1.000 
         
    
  
(5)ROA 0.181 -0.045 -0.088 0.477 1.000 
        
    
  
(6)Invrec -0.105 -0.111 -0.074 -0.029 0.140 1.000 
       
    
  
(7)MB 0.055 -0.032 -0.045 0.048 0.151 -0.030 1.000 
      
    
  
(8)Loss -0.199 0.085 0.062 -0.439 -0.370 -0.232 -0.017 1.000 
     
    
  
(9)Leverage -0.115 -0.005 0.067 -0.266 -0.576 -0.051 -0.182 0.160 1.000 
          
(10)Quick -0.127 0.045 -0.015 -0.157 0.024 -0.225 0.071 0.208 -0.170 1.000 
         
(11)Current -0.133 0.034 -0.014 -0.147 0.045 -0.154 0.064 0.178 -0.186 0.976 1.000 
        
(12)Qualified -0.211 0.002 0.050 -0.393 -0.427 -0.101 -0.080 0.293 0.353 -0.018 -0.036 1.000 
       
(13)Forat 0.309 0.247 -0.003 0.245 0.079 -0.041 0.013 -0.034 -0.071 -0.014 -0.022 -0.063 1.000 
      
(14)Auditor_ms 0.448 0.169 -0.005 0.439 0.138 -0.030 0.021 -0.181 -0.077 -0.076 -0.080 -0.152 0.234 1.000 
     
(15)Analyst 0.682 0.202 0.144 0.706 0.207 -0.093 0.069 -0.280 -0.134 -0.105 -0.103 -0.245 0.224 0.370 1.000 
    
(16)IFRS 0.128 0.500 0.097 0.110 0.059 -0.033 0.010 -0.012 -0.077 0.031 0.016 -0.045 0.335 0.210 0.121 1.000 
   
(17)Cross 0.225 0.018 -0.068 0.261 0.047 -0.063 0.017 -0.062 -0.010 -0.021 -0.025 -0.041 0.174 0.185 0.179 0.060 1.000 
  
(18)HHI 0.041 0.198 -0.135 0.082 0.071 -0.029 0.009 -0.044 -0.063 0.004 -0.003 -0.049 0.239 0.370 0.103 0.405 0.067 1.000 
 
(19)GDP 0.227 0.079 0.584 -0.009 -0.144 -0.121 -0.019 0.130 0.099 0.031 0.038 0.111 -0.197 -0.217 0.045 -0.333 -0.125 -0.453 1.000 
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Table 4 Environmental Policy Stringency and Audit Pricing 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of Ln(AuditFee)t, the natural logarithm of AuditFee, on two 
measures of previous year environmental policy stringency, Envdex_rawt-1 and Envdext-1, respectively. We control for 
previous year firm and country variables that may affect audit fees. Detailed definitions of the variables are in 
Appendix A. We include firm and year-industry fixed effects in the regressions. The numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics calculated using standards errors clustered at the country level. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable: Ln(AuditFee)t 
   
  
Envdex_rawt-1 -0.210*** -0.122*** 
  
 (-3.86) (-4.76)   
Envdext-1 
  -0.068** -0.039** 
   (-2.75) (-2.28) 
Lnat  0.318***  0.318*** 
  (6.44)  (6.41) 
ROA  -0.082***  -0.082*** 
  (-4.98)  (-4.93) 
Invrec  0.238**  0.239** 
  (2.57)  (2.59) 
MB  0.001  0.001 
  (1.35)  (1.38) 
Loss  -0.008  -0.007 
  (-1.25)  (-1.00) 
Leverage  0.040***  0.040*** 
  (4.94)  (4.88) 
Quick  -0.005**  -0.006** 
  (-2.19)  (-2.25) 
Current  -0.005  -0.005 
  (-1.58)  (-1.52) 
Qualified  -0.017*  -0.019** 
  (-1.98)  (-2.20) 
Forat  0.088**  0.085** 
  (2.68)  (2.68) 
Auditor_ms  0.221***  0.222*** 
  (3.38)  (3.36) 
Analyst  0.033***  0.033*** 
  (5.20)  (5.07) 
IFRS  -0.124**  -0.129** 
  (-2.61)  (-2.42) 
Cross  0.072  0.067 
  (0.80)  (0.74) 
HHI  -0.105  -0.112 
  (-1.03)  (-1.07) 
GDP  0.300***  0.289*** 
  (4.15)  (3.79) 
   
  
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year × Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Country Clustering YES YES YES YES 
Observations 123,322 73,710 123,322 73,710 
Adj. R-squared 0.913 0.943 0.913 0.943 
 




Dynamic Analyses of the Relation between Environmental Policy Stringency and Audit Pricing 
 
This table presents the results from dynamic regressions of Ln(AuditFee)t, the natural logarithm of AuditFee, on two 
measures of environmental policy stringency, Envdex_raw and Envdex, respectively. We include the past two years 
and following two years environmental policy stringency levels with the contemporaneous environmental policy 
stringency level in the regressions. We control for previous year firm and country variables that may affect audit fees. 
Detailed definitions of the variables are in Appendix A. We include firm and year-industry fixed effects in the 
regressions. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standards errors clustered at the country level. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  Dependent variable: Ln(AuditFee)t 
   
Envdex_rawt+2 0.033  
 (0.58)  
Envdex_rawt+1 -0.023 
 
 (-0.71)  
Envdex_rawt -0.093** 
 
 (-2.62)  
Envdex_rawt-1 0.013  
 (0.39)  
Envdex_rawt-2 -0.119** 
 
 (-2.20)  
Envdext+2 
 0.012 
  (0.72) 
Envdext+1  0.006 
  (0.66) 
Envdext 
 -0.032** 
  (-2.54) 
Envdext-1 
 0.000 
  (0.01) 
Envdext-2  -0.048** 
  (-2.29) 
Lnat 0.360*** 0.360*** 
 (5.82) (5.82) 
ROA -0.092*** -0.092*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.91) 
Invrec 0.171* 0.161* 
 (2.02) (1.99) 
MB -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.16) 
Loss 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (3.60) (3.46) 
Leverage 0.060*** 0.059*** 
 (3.42) (3.48) 
Quick -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.77) (-0.67) 
Current -0.011** -0.011** 
 (-2.64) (-2.62) 
Qualified 0.013 0.010 
 (0.96) (0.58) 
Forat 0.170*** 0.173*** 
 (4.53) (4.97) 
Auditor_ms 0.766*** 0.767*** 
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 (3.95) (3.95) 
Analyst 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (3.03) (3.00) 
IFRS -0.100** -0.091* 
 (-2.11) (-1.97) 
Cross -0.010 -0.009 
 (-0.20) (-0.19) 
HHI -0.201* -0.211 
 (-1.87) (-1.67) 
GDP 0.443*** 0.487*** 
 (5.06) (5.45) 
  
 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year*Industry FE YES YES 
Country Clustering YES YES 
Observations 59,692 59,692 
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Table 6 Country legal regimes 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of Ln(AuditFee)t, the natural logarithm of AuditFee, on two 
measures of previous year environmental policy stringency, Envdex_rawt-1 and Envdext-1, respectively, by country’s 
legal origins (Law = 1 if the country is with common law legal origin and 0 if with civil law legal origin), level of 
public enforcement of regulations (Enforce is an aggregate measure of public enforcement), and investor protection 
(Share_protect ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the highest protection). We control for previous year firm 
and country variables that may affect audit fees. Detailed definitions of the variables are in Appendix A. We include 
firm and year-industry fixed effects in the regressions. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using 
standards errors clustered at the country level. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dependent variable: Ln(AuditFee)t 
   
    
Envdex_rawt-1× Law -0.188** 
     
 (-2.61)      
Envdext-1× Law 
 -0.117***     
  (-3.41)     
Envdex_rawt-1× Enforce   -0.263**    
   (-2.11)    
Envdext-1× Enforce 
   -0.149***   
    (-2.96)   
Envdex_rawt-1× Share_protect 
    -0.251*  
     (-1.79)  
Envdext-1× Share_protect 
     -0.144** 
      (-2.39) 
Envdex_rawt-1 -0.153*** 
 0.048  0.068  
 (-5.90)  (0.58)  (0.60)  
Envdext-1 
 -0.068***  0.053  0.067 
  (-7.37)  (1.51)  (1.25) 
Lnat 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 
 (6.44) (6.41) (6.27) (6.22) (6.27) (6.23) 
ROA -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.082*** 
 (-4.96) (-4.93) (-4.98) (-4.93) (-4.98) (-4.93) 
Invrec 0.245** 0.250** 0.269** 0.271** 0.266** 0.268** 
 (2.67) (2.74) (2.66) (2.66) (2.64) (2.64) 
MB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.34) (1.37) (1.36) (1.44) (1.36) (1.43) 
Loss -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-1.38) (-1.54) (-1.37) (-1.48) (-1.42) (-1.34) 
Leverage 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (4.92) (4.91) (4.72) (4.66) (4.72) (4.63) 
Quick -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (-2.22) (-2.35) (-2.11) (-2.27) (-2.13) (-2.25) 
Current -0.005 -0.005 -0.006* -0.006** -0.006* -0.005* 
 (-1.60) (-1.63) (-1.98) (-2.10) (-1.85) (-1.86) 
Qualified -0.016* -0.017* -0.012 -0.014* -0.012 -0.014* 
 (-1.87) (-2.04) (-1.62) (-2.03) (-1.64) (-1.93) 
Forat 0.099*** 0.096*** 0.089** 0.081** 0.090** 0.081** 
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 (2.90) (2.87) (2.73) (2.55) (2.78) (2.61) 
Auditor_ms 0.227*** 0.230*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 
 (3.45) (3.44) (3.30) (3.26) (3.28) (3.23) 
Analyst 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 (5.62) (5.78) (7.15) (6.61) (7.15) (6.68) 
IFRS -0.129*** -0.134** -0.172*** -0.186*** -0.179*** -0.199*** 
 (-2.96) (-2.66) (-3.64) (-3.09) (-4.02) (-3.61) 
Cross 0.071 0.063 0.060 0.052 0.062 0.055 
 (0.80) (0.72) (0.70) (0.60) (0.72) (0.63) 
HHI -0.101 -0.093 -0.087 -0.087 -0.096 -0.101 
 (-1.08) (-1.02) (-1.01) (-1.08) (-1.12) (-1.22) 
GDP 0.285*** 0.211*** 0.352*** 0.286*** 0.341*** 0.278*** 
 (4.30) (3.81) (7.14) (5.20) (6.86) (5.63) 
   
    
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 73,710 73,710 71,089 71,089 71,089 71,089 
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Table 7 External monitors 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of Ln(AuditFee)t, the natural logarithm of AuditFee, on two 
measures of previous year environmental policy stringency, Envdex_rawt-1 and Envdext-1, respectively, by firm’s 
number of analysts (Analystt-1 is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm in the 
previous year) and annual institutional investors’ ownership (IOt-1 is the previous year institutional investors’ 
ownership). We control for previous year firm and country variables that may affect audit fees. Detailed definitions 
of the variables are in Appendix A. We include firm and year-industry fixed effects in the regressions. The numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standards errors clustered at the country level. The symbols ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable: Ln(AuditFee)t 
   
  
Envdex_rawt-1× Analystt-1 -0.015**    
 (-2.44)    
Envdext-1× Analystt-1  -0.006***   
 
 (-2.80)   
Envdex_rawt-1× IOt-1   -0.102**  
 
  (-2.51)  
Envdext-1× IOt-1    -0.039* 
 
   (-1.96) 
Envdex_rawt-1 -0.091***  -0.097***  
 (-2.98)  (-3.17)  
Envdext-1  -0.026  -0.030 
 
 (-1.37)  (-1.43) 
IO   0.186*** 0.182* 
 
  (2.91) (1.92) 
Lnat 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 
 (6.47) (6.44) (6.39) (6.36) 
ROA -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 (-4.99) (-4.94) (-4.96) (-4.90) 
Invrec 0.237** 0.236** 0.238** 0.239** 
 (2.56) (2.56) (2.60) (2.60) 
MB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.37) (1.35) (1.42) (1.44) 
Loss -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
 (-1.08) (-0.77) (-1.12) (-0.82) 
Leverage 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (4.84) (4.74) (4.65) (4.60) 
Quick -0.005** -0.005** -0.005* -0.005** 
 (-2.11) (-2.09) (-2.04) (-2.17) 
Current -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.57) (-1.54) (-1.60) (-1.54) 
Qualified -0.017* -0.019** -0.017* -0.019** 
 (-1.97) (-2.20) (-1.94) (-2.19) 
Forat 0.089** 0.088** 0.089** 0.086** 
 (2.71) (2.76) (2.70) (2.68) 
Auditor_ms 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 
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 (3.37) (3.36) (3.42) (3.39) 
Analyst 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (3.73) (3.60) (5.34) (5.26) 
IFRS -0.120** -0.129** -0.140*** -0.150*** 
 (-2.52) (-2.51) (-3.12) (-2.96) 
Cross 0.072 0.068 0.068 0.063 
 (0.81) (0.76) (0.77) (0.71) 
HHI -0.105 -0.112 -0.109 -0.120 
 (-1.04) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-1.20) 
GDP 0.285*** 0.280*** 0.279*** 0.271*** 
 (4.01) (3.67) (3.87) (3.69) 
   
  
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year × Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Country Clustering YES YES YES YES 
Observations 73,710 73,710 73,710 73,710 
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Table 8 Environment-friendly corporate policy 
 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of different measures of firm-specific environmental 
performance on two measures of previous year environmental policy stringency, Envdex_rawt-1 and Envdext-1, 
respectively. The dependent variable in Panel A is “Environmental Pillar Scores,” which captures performances in 
three eco-friendly initiatives of the firms: emission reduction, increase of resource efficiency, and product 
innovation. In Panel B, the dependent variable for Columns (3) and (4) is natural logarithm of the number of 
environment-related patents, and the dependent variable for Columns (5) and (6) is natural logarithm of the number 
of environment-related citations. We control for previous year firm and country variables that may affect 
environmental performances. Detailed definitions of the variables are in Appendix A. We include firm and year-
industry fixed effects in the regressions. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standards errors 




Panel A  
Environmental Pillar Scores 
Panel B  
Green Innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Environment Scoret Ln(Green Patent)t Ln(Green Citation)t 
       
Envdex_rawt+2 0.010 
 -0.005  -0.022***  
 (1.03)  (-1.05)  (-3.85)  
Envdex_rawt+1 0.007 
 -0.002  -0.008**  
 (1.30)  (-0.89)  (-2.25)  
Envdex_rawt 0.004 
 -0.003  -0.005  
 (0.54)  (-1.15)  (-0.89)  
Envdex_rawt-1 0.045*** 
 0.001  0.010  
 (5.08)  (0.29)  (1.15)  
Envdex_rawt-2 0.000 
 0.006*  0.025***  
 (0.02)  (1.84)  (3.12)  
Envdext+2 
 -0.002  -0.004**  -0.017*** 
  (-0.27)  (-2.11)  (-5.76) 
Envdext+1 
 -0.003  0.001  0.002 
  (-0.59)  (0.54)  (0.98) 
Envdext 
 0.007  -0.002*  -0.001 
  (1.51)  (-1.95)  (-0.96) 
Envdext-1 
 0.009**  0.005*  0.009** 
  (2.17)  (1.95)  (2.74) 
Envdext-2 
 -0.003  0.000  0.005** 
  (-0.54)  (0.30)  (2.28) 
Lnat 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 
 (3.56) (3.64) (1.36) (1.37) (0.80) (0.81) 
ROA 0.037 0.037 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.28) (1.27) (-2.47) (-2.51) (-1.66) (-1.50) 
Invrec -0.063 -0.060 -0.019** -0.018** -0.024*** -0.022*** 
 (-0.82) (-0.81) (-2.33) (-2.27) (-3.94) (-4.11) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (3.07) (3.18) (1.13) (1.13) (-0.96) (-0.97) 
Loss 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.37) (0.39) (-0.92) (-0.85) (0.90) (0.95) 
Leverage 0.035 0.034 -0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.006 
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 (0.85) (0.81) (-0.13) (-0.16) (1.64) (1.61) 
Quick 0.018** 0.017** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (2.70) (2.41) (-0.63) (-0.65) (1.21) (1.17) 
Current -0.017** -0.017** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.75) (-2.47) (1.11) (1.16) (-0.55) (-0.49) 
Qualified -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014** -0.013** 
 (-0.07) (-0.05) (-1.45) (-1.39) (-2.40) (-2.22) 
Forat 0.009 0.010 -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.58) (0.61) (-1.03) (-1.11) (-0.75) (-0.84) 
Auditor_ms -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.008 
 (-0.31) (-0.34) (0.53) (0.47) (1.17) (1.06) 
Analyst 0.012 0.011 0.003** 0.002** 0.010* 0.009* 
 (1.26) (1.19) (2.78) (2.53) (2.04) (1.93) 
IFRS -0.022 -0.023 0.001 0.002 0.015** 0.021** 
 (-1.22) (-1.22) (0.28) (0.28) (2.21) (2.24) 
Cross -0.073 -0.076 0.021* 0.020 0.017 0.015 
 (-1.46) (-1.53) (1.77) (1.63) (1.33) (1.14) 
HHI -0.087 -0.097* -0.018 -0.016 -0.050*** -0.045** 
 (-1.62) (-1.76) (-1.60) (-1.32) (-3.16) (-2.26) 
GDP -0.033 -0.046 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.177*** 0.162*** 
 (-0.52) (-0.71) (3.01) (3.20) (5.85) (7.91) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,436 5,436 37,632 37,632 37,632 37,632 
Adj. R-squared 0.797 0.796 0.835 0.835 0.512 0.512 
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